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Since the fall of the Soviet Union Russia has yet to implement an effective state 
ideology to endear the state to its people. Eurasianism could provide a possible 
solution for the state as a concept that places Russia in a unique place between 
Europe and Asia rather than a part of either Europe or Asia. This thesis analyzes 
the concept of Eurasianism, its origins, its most prolific modern proponent, and 
the potential for a state sponsored Eurasianist ideology. Eurasianism itself 
focuses on a unique role for Russia in the realm of international affairs. This 
concept, in turn, provides a form of Russian exceptionalism to its people. The 
Russian state can theoretically use such an ideology to provide a coherent 
argument against Westernization and liberal economic reforms in order to 
maintain control of the country. Furthermore, the concept of Eurasianism can 
also serve as a means to provide Russians with a sense of “Great Power” status 
in line with that of the former Soviet Union. 
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Was Russia ever European? Is it actually more European today than 
before? Despite its size, Russia’s place in the world remains hard to define. As a 
vast country spanning two continents and with very real economic interests in 
each, one cannot define Russia solely in European or Asian terms. Despite its 
origins and cultural similarities to Europe, the country lacks the openness, 
democracy, and free speech that define modern-day Europe. The fall of the 
Soviet Union left an ideological vacuum that forced the state and its people to 
ask even the most fundamental of nationalist questions, namely: What defines 
Russia and the Russian people?   
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This paper focuses on the concept of Russian Eurasianism in its historical 
and contemporary definitions, while expounding on how the idea fits in to the 
current Russian politics. In particular, the thesis asks how Eurasianism formed 
and what role it plays in the Russian Federation. Additionally, the paper 
examines who the primary proponents and detractors of Eurasianist worldviews 
are and seeks to identify how the primary views within these ideas affect Russian 
identity. Finally, it analyzes Eurasianism’s efforts at providing a Russian identity 
and a political ideology.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question aims to define the concept of Eurasianism and 
seek out a relationship between the current body of literature and Russian 
identity. In particular, the thesis outlines the theorists as well as the political 
proponents of Russian Eurasianism. Most central to the concept are the ideas of 
Alexander Dugin, a right-wing Russian writer and former professor at Moscow 
University who remains the foremost ideologue of contemporary Eurasianism. 
However, his are not the only views, and the research question seeks to uncover 
exactly what Eurasianism’s role is in Moscow. 
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The crux of the research question lies in uncovering and expanding upon 
the relationship between Eurasianism and contemporary Russian identity and 
politics. The fall of the Soviet Union left an ideological vacuum in Russia that has 
yet to be filled despite efforts from within both the Yeltsin and Putin governments 
to create a new idea of Russia.1  In order to reassert its relevance and to 
maintain significant role in international relations status, Russia must find a 
relevant ideology that justifies the Putin regime both domestically and 
internationally. The research question asks whether Eurasianism could become 
such an ideology and expand further into greater sphere of Russian politics. 
Historically, Eurasianism served both the political ideas of the state and its 
opposition. Today, it largely supports the state alone, and grows increasingly 
popular as a form a Russian nationalism that glamorizes the unique geopolitical 
position of the Russian Federation. Eurasianism may even serve as possible 
successor to Marxism as state sponsored ideology. However, the term remains 
only loosely defined and subject to change according to political whims. Thus, a 
stricter definition through analysis of the relevant scholarship will define the idea 
and what it means for Russia’s future.   
Dugin is often dismissed by Western sources as little more than a Russian 
ultranationalist.2  However, a number of Duma members and Russian oligarchs 
share his far from uncommon views.3 His appointment as a professor at Moscow 
State University shows not only his relevance in modern Russia, but the 
continued rise of Eurasianism as an ideology.4 A full examination of these views 
remains necessary to ascertain how they affect Russian policy. 
                                            
1 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy 
Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain. 
2 Dina Newman, “Russian Nationalist Thinker Dugin Sees War with Ukraine,” BBC News, 
July 9, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28229785. 
3 Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2008), trans. Mischa Gabowitsch, 142. 
4 Dina Newman, “Russian Nationalist Thinker Dugin.” 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the work on Eurasianism reflects on the origins of the concept 
through the ideas of a number of writers. The advent of Eurasianism as a 
geopolitical concept occurs immediately following the 1917 Russian revolution 
and the ensuing Russian civil war. Today, the original form of Eurasianism is 
generally referred to as Classical Eurasianism and remains a relevant area of 
scholarship. Modern studies mention a number of writers in regard to origins of 
Classical Eurasianism, but no canon of essential Classical Eurasianists exist. 
Writers including Petr Savitskii, Lev Gumilev, Prince Nikolay S. Trubetskoi, 
Roman O. Jakobson, Georg V. Vernadsky, and Alexander Panarin contributed to 
this first iteration of Eurasianism. 
Additionally, Prince Esper Ukhtomskii’s work on developing the concept of 
Asianism and the Russia is shown to have been a precursor to Eurasianism in 
Paradorn Rangsimaporn’s “Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia’s 
role in East Asia.”5  Milan Hauner’s work “What Is Asia to Us?” goes further back 
to uncover the origins of 1920’s Eurasianism.6  He reflects upon the idea of the 
“Middle World” by Vladimir I. Lamansky as the origins of the original Eurasianism 
while detailing other individuals who contributed Lamansky’s synopsis.7  Among 
the Eurasianists, only Savitskii is mentioned repeatedly. His Eurasianism 
espouses the Russianness through the concept of territory. He uses continued 
expansion as a means of maintaining territorial integrity and preventing 
incursions upon Russia itself.8  His ideas couple well with the historical scare 
rooted in the Mongol invasion and occupation of Russia in order to justify 
Russia’s expansion into Asia.   
                                            
5 Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia’s Role in East 
Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 3 (2006): 373, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451203. 
6 Milan Hauner, What is Asia to Us?: Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today 
(Boston: Billing and Sons, 1990), 158. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 61–62. 
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Many authors use the modern form of Eurasianism as a concept 
explaining expansionist policies of the Russian Federation. Some articles note 
the popularity of Dugin’s ideas among the Russian elite, but hard data to show 
causality proves difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.9  The relationship between 
the concept of Eurasianism and the Putin government’s policies and actions 
merits exploration to better define the extent in which the Eurasianists influence 
Russian policy. The conservative Putin regime largely seeks to find a special role 
for Russia in Europe as a means of balancing against the European Union’s 
expansionist policies. Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn make such an 
argument in their piece in Foreign Affairs titled “Putin’s Brain” by explaining the 
relationship between Alexander Dugin and Putin and how it ties into Russian 
policy. While Dugin certainly has influence in the state Duma, the amount of his 
influence in the regime itself remains less clear. 
Dugin’s popularity and political views empower both Russian supremacists 
and ultra-nationalists. These concepts are often referred to with Dugin’s own 
term: Neo-Eurasianism. The extent to which Neo-Eurasianism and radicalism 
coincide requires further investigation. While Dugin himself espouses a 
somewhat less radicalized view, Richard Arnold and Ekaterina Romanova’s “The 
White World’s Future” analyzes Eurasianism’s use by the far right.10 In the 
article, they evaluate the concept of Eurasianism in racial as opposed to 
geopolitical terms as seen by the Russian far right. The convergence of 
Eurasianism and ultra-nationalism warrants further exploration if only to clarify 
the differences between Dugin’s Eurasianism and those of the more extremist 
factions.  
In many cases, the literature finds a relationship between the rise of 
Eurasianism and the perceived rise of anti-Westernism in the Russian 
                                            
9 John B. Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics,” the Fourth Political 
Theory. Accessed June 5, 2014. http://www.4pt.su/en/node/444/backlinks. 
10 Richard Arnold and Ekaterina Romanova, “The “White World’s Future?”: An Analysis of 
the Russian Far Right,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 7, no. 1 (2013): 79–107, doi: 
10.1353/jsr.2013.0002. 
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Federation. On solely political terms, Eurasianism fits well into an anti-Western 
framework as shown in Vladimir Papava’s “The Eurasianism of Russian anti-
Westernism and the Concept of ‘Central Caucaso-Asia.’”11  Dugin disagrees with 
the international relations policies of the United States and the degree to which 
Eurasianism coincides with anti-Westernism proves important for a full 
understanding of the concept in Russia.12 
Importantly, both the initial Eurasianist movement and the contemporary 
one occurred during a period of ideological change in Russia, but not necessarily 
an ideological vacuum. The 1920’s Soviet Union could fully embrace 
Communism while using Eurasianism as a means to explore policy ideas; the 
current Eurasianism could potentially achieve such a primacy in the Russian 
Federation.13  While the scholarship espouses the relation between Classical 
and Neo-Eurasianism, few take lengths to examine Russia in the context of each 
ideology.   
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: the second chapter 
focuses on the origins of Eurasianism and its growth.  The chapter begins with 
looking at Moscow at precursors that influenced Eurasianism and then provides 
an overview of the Classical Eurasianists.   
The third Chapter provides an overview of Neo-Eurasianism and 
Alexander Dugin. Importantly, it covers his background and the central tenets of 
his Neo-Eurasianist goals and mission. Also, the chapter discusses his relations 
with other movements and how they influence his goals for Neo-Eurasianism.   
                                            
11 Vladimer Papava, “The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of 
Central Caucaso-Asia,” Russian Politics and Law 51, no. 6 (2013): 45, doi:10.2753/RUP1061-
1940510602. 
12 Alexander Dugin, “Letter to the American People on Ukraine,” Open Revolt. Last modified 
March 8, 2014, http://openrevolt.info/2014/03/08/alexander-dugin-letter-to-the-american-people-
on-ukraine/. 
13 John B. Dunlop, “Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics.”  
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The fourth chapter explores the whether Eurasianism serves or will serve 
as an ideology and identity for Russia and its people. The chapter questions 
whether Eurasianism provides a viable, albeit non-European, identity to the 
Russian people. It reviews Russia’s role as a Great Power and asks whether 
Eurasianism as an ideology help fills the vacuum of Great Power status following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.14   
The fifth and final chapter provides an overview of Dugin’s Neo-
Eurasianism and the Putin administration. Through exploring the needs of the 
administration today, the paper analyzes how much Eurasianism fulfills Putin’s 
needs for a state-sponsored ideology.  The chapter concludes with a final 
assertion about possible causality between the theory and Russian policy. 
                                            
14 Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium (Washington, DC: United Press, 2011), 205. 
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II. CLASSICAL EURASIANISM 
Russia belongs with Europe, according to Richard Pipes, “by virtue of her 
location, race, and religion”; however, proponents of both Classical and Neo-
Eurasianism point to location, race, and religion of Russia as evidence to show 
that it does not belong to Europe.15  Russia’s location remains only partially in 
Europe, and the overwhelming majority of its territory is in Asia. Russia’s Slavic 
race connects it to Eastern and Southern Europe, while remaining a separate, 
definable, ethnicity from other Slavs. Finally, Russia’s nationalized Orthodox 
Christianity separates as much as unites Russia from the Catholic and Protestant 
Christian traditions of Europe.16 Eurasian proponents look toward these and a 
myriad of other reasons, ranging from the Cyrillic script to food as justification for 
rejecting European and Western values and continuing on a path of authoritarian 
rule and empire. The first Eurasianists used these aspects to justify Russia’s own 
cultural heritage, perceived backwardness, and to a certain extent, even the 
Soviet Union.  Many of these uniquely Russian societal aspects influence the 
modern-day Neo-Eurasianists including Russian Messianism, Slavophilism, and, 
naturally, Classical Eurasianism. 
A. PRECURSORS AND INFLUENCES TO EURASIANISM 
Classical Eurasianism first emerges as a political theory in the 1920s, but 
its origins predate the revolutionary landscape. The initial proponents of 
Eurasianism took their influence from ideals aimed at creating and building the 
Russian state itself. Beginning with the messianic idea of seeing Moscow as the 
“Third Rome,” Eurasianists sought and found those unique concepts of Russia 
that sets it apart from Europe.17  Through the emphasis of such traditions, the 
                                            
15 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), xxi. 
16 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 2004), 52-
53. 
17 Dimitri Strémooukhoff, “Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine,” Speculum 28, 
no. 1 (1953): 84-86, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2847182. 
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Eurasianists created a similar ideal through the amalgamation of differing 
concepts that shared a single commonality—that of giving Russia a unique a 
positive role in global affairs.  
1. Moscow as the Third Rome 
The concept of believing in Moscow as the “Third Rome” makes for the 
earliest beginnings of Russians seeing their state as a unique entity that rests 
apart from both Europe and Asia. Moscow as the Third Rome rests on the tenet 
that following the fall of Rome, the Byzantine Empire, with its head in 
Constantinople, continued the traditions of the Christian Church and secured its 
survival and legitimacy.18  According to the theory, the capture of Constantinople 
by the Ottomans in 1453 paved the way for the burden of Christendom to fall 
upon the Muscovite empire.19 In the early 1500s, the Orthodox Monk, Philotheus 
of Pskov, wrote a letter to Tsar Vassily III claiming Moscow as the Third Rome 
and espoused the survival and prosperity of Moscow as proof of its and the 
Russian Empire’s holiness.20  This act of claiming Moscow as the new center of 
Christendom served to legitimize the state by maintaining an uninterrupted center 
of Christian dogma that inherited the traditions of both Rome and Byzantium. The 
idea would then evolve into a state ideology that legitimized the rule of Russian 
tsars through amalgamating Russian Orthodox doctrine in the state. 
Upon first glance, the Third Rome ideology holds little weight in showing 
the trappings of Eurasianism, especially since at the time, religious doctrine 
formed a crucial means to protect a ruler’s legitimacy. The Third Rome ideology 
does, however, show the beginnings of Russians seeing themselves as apart 
from the rest of Europe in a moral and metaphysical sense. Most importantly, the 
Third Rome concept emphasizes Russia as a state apart from Europe while 
promoting the idea that one cannot easily classify Russia as European; this 
                                            
18 Dimitri Strémooukhoff, “Moscow the Third Rome,” 84-86. 
19 Ibid., 91. 
20 Robert Lee Wolff, “The Three Romes: The Migration of an Ideology and the Making of an 
Autocrat,” Daedalus 88, no. 2, (1959): 292, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2847182. 
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continues to play the pivotal role in both Classical and Neo-Eurasianism.21  The 
theory itself does not prove crucial to the modern arguments of Eurasianism, as 
the Third Rome idea relies solely upon a religious argument, whereas 
Eurasianism sees religion and the preservation of Orthodox values as a single 
component of a larger whole.   
2. Turning toward and away from Europe 
Peter the Great would undermine the idea of seeing Moscow as a Third 
Rome with his attempts to Europeanize the state. His programs went from 
reforming education to forbidding beards in court and helped instill in Russia the 
need to gauge its own economic, intellectual, and cultural growth in relation to 
the rest of Europe.22  Peter himself did not see Russia as necessarily inferior to 
Europe, but his reforms forced the Russian elites to question their own cultural 
heritage and development as a people.23  With European influence, came 
genuine reforms and imitation, but it also damaged the uniqueness of Russia. By 
showing the superiority of European knowledge and culture in comparison to 
Russia’s own, Peter created a latent desire in the Russian elite to become more 
European at the cost of their own Russia heritage.24 Peter also sent Russian 
elites and military officers to Europe for education and these students could now 
see for themselves the superior technology and knowledge of the rest of 
Europe.25  His efforts unintentionally undermined the perceived divine mission of 
the Russian state by showing it as it really stood outside of cultural arguments-
inferior to the rest of Europe. Additionally, Peter’s actions set a precedent for 
                                            
21 Elie Denissoff, “On the Origins of the Autonomous Russian Church,” The Review of 
Politics 12, no. 2 (1950): 225, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405055. 
22 Mark Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of 
Geographical Space,” Slavic Review 50, no. 1 (1991): 5, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2500595. 
23 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 268. 
24 James H. Billington, Russia in Search of Itself, 151. 
25 William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia: 1600–1914 (New York: the Free Press, 
1992), 35–36. 
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Efforts to Europeanize in Russia that Classical and Neo-Eurasianists actively 
fight. 
In the 19th century, Russian Messianism would further emphasize the 
uniqueness of the Tsarist Empire and help build further foundations for 
Eurasianism while serving as an answer to Peter the Great’s Europeanization. 
Russian Messianism takes the idea of Russia as a “Third Rome” beyond simply 
preserving the purist form of Christianity, but to actually saving Europe from itself. 
Russia held some legitimate evidence in saving Europe from both itself and 
outside forces. The Napoleonic wars, in particular, substantialized the religious 
tenets of Russian Messianism in the Russian victory over France.26  Messianism 
also took the overthrow of Mongol rule and Russia’s victories over the Ottoman 
Empire into account alongside the defeat of Napoleon. Combined, these conflicts 
and the suffering Russia experienced helped justify Russians seeing themselves 
as both apart from and saviors of Europe.27  Above all, the Napoleonic Wars 
helps justify the Russian Messianic ideal; according to Peter Duncan’s 
monograph, Russian Messianism, in fighting Napoleon, Tsar Alexander, 
“believed he had a holy mission from God to defend Europe from liberals and 
revolutionaries, whom he considered anti-Christian.”28   
Alongside Russian Messianism, Slavophilism rose as a new ideology 
arguing for a unique and influential role of the Slavs that influences Classical 
Eurasianism. Slavophilism demonstrates the backlash against Western Europe 
culture in 19th century Russia that sets the foundations and influences for the 
first Eurasianists.29  The Slavophiles saw Western ideas, and particularly, the 
West’s focus on the individual, as a corrupting factor to the people. To 
                                            
26 Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: a Study in Identity and International 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 1996), 15–21. 
27  Peter J.S. Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism, and After  
(London: Routledge, 2000), 7. 
28 Ibid., 17.  
29 Graham Smith, “The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New 
Eurasianism,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999): 482, doi: 
10.1111/j.0020-2754.1999.t01-2-00481.x. 
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circumvent the Western influence, they began to regard the peasant and rural 
lifestyle with high esteem and some even saw the Russian village, or mir, as the 
highest form of moral conscience.30  By promoting the mir, the Slavophiles 
empowered and justified peasant traditions while promoting their revisionist 
history and the culture of Russia. They particularly reviled Peter the Great and 
his closeness to Europe and saw that period as a discontinuation of Russian 
heritage.31  Importantly, these ideas came about at the same time as 
Romanticism flourished in Europe and Slavophilism not only sought a return to 
nature but a distinctly Russian one at that. Slavophilism would influence the 
Eurasianists to promote the uniqueness of Russia beyond its religious aspects 
and to see morality itself tied to more than just the Russian Orthodox Church but 
to its cultural traditions as well.  
3. War’s Further Influences 
The Crimean War would further encourage Russians to perceive 
themselves with a separate identity from Europe. According to John Shelton 
Curtiss’ book, Russia’s Crimean War, following the war, “Russia was generally 
viewed as a powerful country, but backward and underdeveloped.”32  The 
Crimean War brought against Russia an alliance of France, Great Britain, and 
the Ottoman Empire that encouraged Russia to seek its identity outside of 
Europe for two reasons. First and foremost, the war showed that France and 
Great Britain feared the growth of the Russian State, and secondly, it showed 
that despite the cultural and religious differences between Europe and the 
Ottoman Empire, the strongest states in Europe would defend the Ottomans to 
prevent Russia’s expansion. On both accounts, Russia could no longer seek a 
European solution for its desire to expand territorially and culturally as the rest of 
Europe decided to balance the Russian Empire with force. Perhaps more 
                                            
30 Janko Lavrin, “Khomyakov and the Slavs,” The Russian Review 23, no. 1 (1964): 42, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/126450. 
31 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 266–68. 
32 John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Duke: University Press, 1979), 529. 
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importantly, the war showed the lack of respect given to Russia by the rest of the 
Europe. Despite cultural ties between Russia and Europe, the war demonstrated 
that Western Europeans still perceived Russia as a threat and this encouraged 
Russians to seek not only justification for their loss but for a means to counteract 
the perceived backwardness of Russia in the eyes of Western Europe. As a 
result, Russia would look more toward the East than the West to expand its 
empire.33   
Russian Messianism would return to the forefront of national 
consciousness in the Russo-Turkic War of 1877. This war between Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire occurred in part due to the treatment of the Slavs by the 
Ottomans. For the course of the war, Russians saw themselves as liberators and 
also sought a demonstration of the power to Western Europe following the loss in 
the Crimean War. Russia succeeded in winning independence from the Ottoman 
Empire for Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania and nearly captured Istanbul, the 
primordial holy city of Orthodox Christianity.34  These acts helped to legitimate 
and define messianic ideology and justifying Russia’s preeminence in 
Slavophilist doctrine. Taken together, the war helped to transform the ideas of 
Russian Messianism and Slavophilism into a distinctly Russian form of 
nationalism.35  For the future Eurasianists, the war would further define the 
special role of Russia and international affairs through its efforts to free Slavic 
states and fight the Ottomans, but it also showed the Eurasianists how Russia 
could never be a truly “European” country. Russia signed the treaty of San 
Stefano ending the war in part due to the interventions expected by the British 
Empire to prevent Russian expansion. Once again, outside powers sought to 
limit Russia’s growth and the Eurasianists would use this to justify seeking 
growth beyond the confines of Europe. 
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B. THE BIRTH OF EURASIANISM 
Eurasianism did not have a single father or even a definable set of 
precedents that led to its creation, but generally, according to Boris Ishboldin, an 
initial Western writer to research the concept, “The first Eurasianists would form 
in emigrant intellectual circles in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet 
Revolution.”36  They aimed to create a functional ideology and not simply 
proselytize Russian uniqueness and eminence. As a movement primarily formed 
in European academic circles, the Eurasianists sought to justify the perceived 
backwardness of their homeland while accounting for the Soviet revolution.37  In 
order to do so, the Eurasianists argued against the preeminence of European 
culture and especially the use of European ideas and progress to gauge Russian 
development. Since Peter, the Russian empire generally held Western Europe in 
high regard as far as its cultural achievements and general progress went. The 
Eurasianists sought to reverse this idea in order to argue for a separate, differing 
path.  They believed events and cultural identities such as the Mongol Horde, 
Orthodox Church, and land in the Far East all helped create a uniquely Eurasian 
culture differing from that of the rest of Europe.  
The Eurasianist idea of seeking a separate path from Europe was by no 
means new, but the Eurasianists employed new means to justify their ideology. 
The Slavophiles, Pan-Slavists, and even Russian nationalists argued for a 
divergence between Europe and Russia and insisted one cannot judge Russia in 
relation to Europe. Even the great Russian novelist Dostoyevsky made a 
separation from “European Europe” a central theme, according to Joseph Frank 
on Dostoyevsky’s Winter Notes on Summer Impressions: “Dostoevsky’s purpose 
in Winter Notes is to convey the idea that European civilization is based on a 
soulless, heart-less materialism, and to imply by contrast-in virtue of his own 
reaction as a Russian-that such a civilization is inimical and anti-pathetic to the 
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Russian spirit.”38 While Dostoevsky is not an Eurasianist, he makes it clear that 
Russia’s cultural differences never let it fully separate from Europe. The 
Eurasianists saw these same differences between Russia and the west as a 
means of salvation in both its conservative moral and physical geography.   
1. Nikolai Trubetskoi 
Scholars generally credit the beginnings of the Eurasianist movement to 
Nikolai Trubetskoi, an exiled Russian Prince and Phonologist by trade, arguing 
against the European model of liberal development as the only means for a 
culture or state to measure progress.39  His argument differed from those 
seeking a special place for Russian or Slavic traditions, such as Slavophilism and 
Russian Messianism, by arguing for a separate path of development rather than 
simply espousing the superiority of Russian or Russian Slavic culture. The 
concept of a different means of growth for a culture or state rendered superfluous 
any attempt to gage Russian cultural and even technological development by 
Western academics. His argument set the Eurasianist precedent to gauge 
Russian civilization on the basis of intangible ideals such as religion, 
conservatism, and especially geographic expansion in order to place Russia and 
its development alongside but not in direct competition with Europe.40 
Trubetskoi also used the mixing of Russian blood with Central Asian and 
Steppic peoples as a means to show the divergence between Russians and their 
European counterparts.41  For him, the Russian proximity to Turks and Fins 
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created a unique state entity and only through the creation of a Eurasian state 
could the successor to tsarist Russia survive.42  Unlike the Slavophiles and some 
later Eurasianists, he saw the mixing of Russian blood in a positive light and 
even as a unifying force between the peoples of Russia. He went so far as to 
believe all Eurasian peoples would eventually unite under Eurasianism and its 
tenets while letting their own ethnic and primordial identities fade away.43  
However, Trubetskoi also believed that ethnicity played a smaller role than 
geography and the closeness of the Great Russians to both Turks and the many 
other peoples adjacent and within Russia’s borderlands.44  Either way, 
Trubetskoi used both ethnicity and geography to differentiate Russia from 
Europe, and he accounts for Russian patrimonial traditions by arguing for the 
creation of a singular Eurasian “Ideocracy” to govern a future Russian state.45   
2. Petr Savitskii 
Along with Trubetskoi, Petr Savitskii did the most to help create a 
standardized Eurasian ideal. A geographer by trade, Savitskii used the vastness 
and diversity of the Russian landscape to develop a geopolitical Eurasianism 
alongside Trubetskoi.46  According to Savitskii, the expansive Russian 
geography leads to a “Third Way” which lies outside of either Europe or Asia and 
that any grouping with either continent or cultural tradition fails to account for 
Russian realities.47  As the world’s largest country in terms of land, Russia 
occupies a significant portion of both Europe and Asia though its population 
remains largely relegated to the European portion. However, the size itself 
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helped cement the belief in Savitskii that Russia never became fully European 
despite its cultural ties and the proximity of its population centers to Europe. 
Savitskii also takes the idea of Russian geography further by claiming Eurasian 
nationalism based on the vastness of Russia alone does not allow for European 
social ideals and shows Asian and particularly Mongol influence in Russia.48 
Of all the Classical Eurasianists, Savitskii is the only Eurasianist who 
dedicated his works specifically toward Eurasianism and did the most of all the 
Classical Eurasianists to develop its doctrine.49  Beginning with his 1921 
brochure, the Turn to the East, Savitskii began to promote and spread the 
Eurasianist message through émigré groups.50  He agreed entirely with 
Trubetskoi on the need for authoritarian leadership in Russia. According to Boris 
Ishboldin, “Savitskii accepted these political views of Trubetskoi, agreeing that 
Eurasia must be governed by an enlightened and idealistic minority which would 
be selected in conformity with the ruling ‘total idea,’ since only that idea could 
determine in a rational way the future development of the complex Eurasian 
community of peoples.”51  Additionally, Savitskii continued to write on 
Eurasianism throughout his life and his works and correspondence would provide 
enough material for the Neo-Eurasianists to revisit when formulating their own 
doctrine. 
3. Lev Gumilev 
Following Savitskii, Lev Gumilev continued to develop Eurasianism up 
until his death shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union.  Gumilev even referred to 
himself as the “last Eurasian.”52  He wrote throughout the latter half of the 20th 
century and would carry on Eurasianist traditions while developing his own 
particular stance. Gumilev came from a prominent family in Imperial Russia (both 
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his parents were renowned poets) and as such, he faced difficulty in gaining 
acceptance to Soviet universities and even spent time in the gulag.53  By the 
1960s, however, Gumilev earned a lecturing position at Leningrad state that 
allowed him to further his writing and develop his own Eurasianist theories. 
Gumilev’s writing and expertise concentrated on ethnicity in contrast to his friend 
Savitskii’s geography; however, he would maintain a correspondence with 
Savitskii that helped coalesce his own ideas on Russia’s third way.54  The two 
came to the same conclusion in seeing Russia and its Eurasian ideal as culturally 
and morally superior to Europe and Gumilev brought the idea of Eurasianism into 
the mind set of post-Soviet Russians.55 Though he died shortly after the 
formation of the Russian Federation he remained a functional bridge between 
Classical and Neo-Eurasianists and allows Neo-Eurasianist to argue the concept 
remains unbroken from its origins. 
Gumilev created a theory of ethnogenesis, or biological determinism, and 
used it to glorify the Great Russians that distances himself from the other 
Eurasianists.56  This theory placed one’s ethnic group at the center of an 
individual’s own identity and claims that true personal growth may only come 
through the development of one’s ethnic group as a whole. His insistence on 
using ethnicity as a means to elevate Russians and the Soviet Union over 
Europe led to a number of modern scholars to classify him as either Neo or 
Trans-Eurasianist rather than a Classical Eurasianist alongside Trubetskoi and 
Savitskii.57  Even Savitskii himself did not see Gumilev as an Eurasianist despite 
their correspondence.58  For example, Gumilev even goes so far as to argue that 
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a person’s ethnicity forms their only true identity.59  According to Marlene 
Laurelle, “For him [Gumilev], territory is not a sufficient condition for the 
emergence of an ethnos [ethnic group of people].”60 In addition to his writing, 
Gumilev only appeared after the Classical Eurasianists and did not begin writing 
in earnest until the 1960s. This later appearance along with a lack of stress on 
geography creates the division on classifying Gumilev, but he nevertheless 
significantly influences the thought of modern Eurasianists. 
In addition to his concentration on ethnicity, Gumilev’s attitude toward 
Communism and the Soviet Union differentiated him from other Eurasianists. He 
actively sought to incorporate the role of the Soviet Union into Eurasianist 
doctrine. To begin with, Gumilev wrote in the Soviet Union in contrast to the 
émigré Eurasianists who predated him. After serving time in labor camps, he 
lived long enough to see the fall of the Soviet Union and lamented its demise 
while the Classical Eurasianists were at odds with the Soviet Union’s official 
Socialist ideology but still promoted a Russia led empire across the steppe. 
According to Boris Ishboldin, “They [Classical Eurasianists] acclaimed the 
Bolsheviks for having restored the unity and statehood of the great Eurasian 
empire, but deplored their Communist ideology as false and vacuous.”61  The 
reliance on geography as a means to justify Russian authoritarianism also forced 
the Eurasianists to see the need for Russia to maintain an empire as part of its 
identity. This need likewise allowed them to see the Mongol occupation of Russia 
in a different light. To Eurasianists, the Mongols forced Russia to pursue a path 
of cultural growth that differed from the West and centered on an authoritarian 
means of governance.62  Ultimately, the Eurasianists were forced to accept the 
Soviet Union as a means to maintain a Russian empire which forms central in the 
Eurasianist interpretation of Russian identity. Also, Gumilev could, unlike other 
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Eurasianists, actively lament the fall of the Soviet Union because of his status as 
a Soviet citizen rather than an émigré.  
Gumilev remains important in Eurasianist thought because of his immense 
popularity in present-day Russia, despite remaining relatively obscure in Soviet 
academic circles. His ideas only gradually achieved popularity in the Soviet 
Union and even then only in relation to ethnic relations but became very popular 
following the end of the Soviet Union.63  The fall of the Soviet Union allowed a 
previously dormant Russian nationalism with ethnic leanings to grow in the 
Russian Federation and Gumilev’s theories help create the post-Soviet 
Discourse. The emphasis on ethnic Great Russians came about as the 
population of Russia remains very much ethnically Russian whereas the 
population of the Soviet Union encompassed multitudes of peoples and 
ethnicities. Today, Gumilev’s revisionist and ethnocentric history of Russia is 
even taught in many of Russia’s schools and textbooks down to the high school 
and into the college level.64   Perhaps more dangerously, Gumilev sought to 
base his theories on the natural sciences as opposed to the humanities.65  His 
theories of ethnogenesis and “passionarity” hold almost no purely scientific value, 
but his efforts to present them as such lead to a dangerous perception of his 
ideas as fact that only further increases his popularity as an ideologist. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Classical Eurasianism remains a very inconsistent model that lacked a 
fully defined set of ideological ideals; however the inconsistency allowed 
Eurasianism to adapt to the post-Soviet environment. Eurasianism, at its very 
heart, formed a set of tenets to justify the lack of Russian development and 
perceived backwardness to the West. Geography cannot match economics and 
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education to justify a lack of development though many of the ideals the 
Eurasianists espouse help explain the lack of liberal reform in the Russian and 
Soviet states. For instance, the Eurasianists use the Mongol invasion and the 
path of dependence it created not only set a precedent for authoritarianism, but 
the ensuing vacuum of power from the fall of the Mongol Empire allowed Russian 
expansion to the very edges of Asia.   
The Eurasianism of Savitskii in particular, but to certain extent all the 
classical Eurasianists, forms a hybridization of the ideas of Russian Messianism 
through geopolitics.66 By placing the geography of Russia as the central 
component of Eurasianism, the Eurasianists make the clearest difference 
between Russia and the West, territory, fully apparent and use it to create an 
idealized Russia based on an aspect of the state that remains obviously superior 
to Europe. Importantly, Russia never developed a specific ideological role for its 
expansion and development of its Far East and Siberian territories; Russia 
lacked its own version of Manifest Destiny.67  Eurasianism provided such an 
ideology by creating the idea of Russia as a bridge between the East and the 
West and using the expansion itself as proof of the superior developmental 
characteristics of both Imperial Russia and its Slavs.   
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III. ALEXANDER DUGIN AND NEO-EURASIANISM 
Modern Eurasianism differed greatly from Classical Eurasianism in its 
goals and proponents. Like Classical Eurasianism, the modern version began as 
a means to express both a divergence from the West and as an outlet for anti-
Western sentiments throughout the Russian Federation. Modern Eurasianism 
emerged following the Soviet collapse with the emergence of Alexander Panarin 
and Alexander Dugin who both strived to control the “Third Way” dialogue of 
post-Soviet Russia.68  With an independent Russia, the identity of the Russian 
people in part reverted to the primordial Russian ideal that combines Orthodoxy 
and conservatism as the national identity of the state. This idea stood in stark 
contrast to that of Russians who sought liberal reforms and a more Westernized 
identity. Despite such dialogue on westernization, these reforms were either 
short-lived or never really took place. As Karen Dawisha states,  “while many 
people with democratic aspirations live in Russia, the state is not a democratic 
state in any form any longer, even though its constitution is based on democratic 
principles.”69  Eurasianists, seizing an opportunity, then sought to justify Russia’s 
largely rentier economic model and authoritarian proclivities while furthering their 
own interests. To do so, they combined traditional Russian ideals with a varying 
degree of messianism to “rescue” Russia from the seemingly overwhelming 
forces of liberalization, Europeanization or Atlanticism, and the increasingly 
globalized economy. 
This chapter focuses on the Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin, the theory’s 
most vocal and visible proponent. Other modern Eurasianists lack Dugin’s 
prominence (or have died as in the case of Alexander Panarin), and he remains 
the primary ideologue touting the new, or Neo-Eurasianism. As Andreas Umland 
states, “Dugin is, by now, firmly located within the mainstream of Russian political 
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and intellectual life. He publishes in major newspapers and is regularly invited to 
top-notch political and academic round-tables and conferences.”70  Dugin 
occupies Eurasianism’s foremost pulpit because of his ability to influence those 
beyond the academic sphere. He appears on talk shows, maintains websites, 
and supports like-minded politicians.71  All these efforts paint Dugin as the most 
vocal Eurasianist and shows a fundamental difference between his Eurasianism 
and that of Trubetskoi and Savitskii in the 1920s. The Classical Eurasianists, 
seeking a means to justify the perceived backwardness of Russia, largely aimed 
the debate toward Europeans and the West.  The current wave of Eurasianism 
seeks to garner support primarily amongst Russians and the Russian elite. Dugin 
especially seeks public support, but in his desire for support he functions less as 
an Eurasianist Ideologue and more as a political proponent putting an academic 
face to an intrinsic anti-Western message. 
A. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NEO AND CLASSICAL 
EURASIANISM 
A number of important differences separate Classical Eurasianism from 
Neo-Eurasianism. Classical Eurasianism formed outside of the Soviet Union, but 
the modern Eurasianists write primarily in Russia itself. Due to their location, two 
forces play upon the Modern Eurasianists that the Classical Eurasianists never 
experienced: the state and Russians as a whole. The Russian state largely 
retains control over the media and uses it to serve its own needs. As such, 
Eurasianists abide within the limits set by the Russian government and, 
moreover, almost entirely support the Putin regime. James Harrington even 
notes, “It [Eurasianism] is more political and less philosophical than the earlier 
Eurasianism.”72  The Eurasianists also remain open to influence by the people. 
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In order to remain relevant (and to maintain academic postings) the Eurasianists 
must abide at least in part to the currents of Russian zeitgeist. Both of these 
aspects leave the Eurasianists open to influence by state forces. The Classical 
Eurasianists created an ideal that was aimed at Europeans and themselves, but 
the current ones must remain mindful of the needs of the Russian state and its 
people. 
1. Defining Modern Eurasianism in Classical Eurasianist Terms 
Modern Eurasianism, like Classical Eurasianism, remains exceedingly 
difficult to compile into a coherent set of ideas and precepts. It lacks the number 
of proponents of Classical Eurasianism, yet a scarcity of ideologues does little to 
help codify the ideal. Overall, modern Eurasianism still centers upon Russia 
seeking a “Third Way” apart from either Europe or Asia and the messianic idea 
that it is Russia’s duty to save Europe form itself. The West’s varying academic 
views of Eurasianism have done little to help clarify it. Multiple naming 
conventions given to Eurasianism by academics and further confuse the new 
Eurasianism’s ideas: Neo-Eurasianism, Trans-Eurasianism, Pragmatic-
Eurasianism, Intercivilizational-Eurasianism, Alarmist Eurasianism, Intellectual 
Eurasianism and others all diminish the actual meaning of Eurasianism itself and 
serve many purposes rather than a singular one.73    
2. Alexander Dugin and His Ambivalent Eurasianist Heritage 
Alexander Dugin makes many assertions of his own Eurasianist heritage. 
According to Mark Bassin, “for Dugin more than anyone else, the claim to 
represent the political-intellectual legacy of Classical Eurasianism is a 
fundamental element of the overall message.”74  Eurasianism provides the 
perceived legitimacy Dugin needs to proselytize his own worldview and maintain 
support from right-wing Russians. As such, Dugin alters his Eurasianist vision to 
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fulfill the current ideological of the regime. Some argue Dugin simply has his own 
version of Eurasianism; however, his Eurasianism differs too drastically from the 
Classical Eurasianism to form any real intellectual precedent.75  Dugin’s own 
politics form a much larger scope than Classical Eurasianism and cover ideas 
such as metaphysics, conspiracy theories, and traditionalism that hardly belong 
in an academic setting. In addition to arguing for a distinctive Russia, Dugin looks 
to create and expand boundaries and alliances with other states including China, 
Japan, and India.76  In many ways, his rhetoric leans more toward justifying 
Russia as a Great Power rather than in response to cultural and economic 
globalization.   
Dugin fails to adequately base his Eurasianism as a product of Classical 
Eurasianism in spite of his insistence on using the term. In his 2012 book, the 
Fourth Political Theory, he argues Neo-Eurasianism supplanted the ideas of 
Classical Eurasianism with “attention to traditionalism, geopolitics, structuralism, 
the fundamental-ontology of Heidegger, sociology, and anthropology.”77  On the 
same page, he traces Neo-Eurasianism to the Classical Eurasianists through 
Nikolai Trubetskoi’s phonology protégé Claude Levi-Strauss.78  He then argues 
that Claude Levi-Strauss’ theories on structural anthropology influence Neo-
Eurasianism to such an extent as to allow it to remain connected to Classical 
Eurasianism. To clarify, Dugin uses two separate areas of the humanities, one 
with loose ties to Eurasianism (structural anthropology) and another with none at 
all (phonology), to argue for a classical origin to his version of Eurasianism. Thus, 
one can surmise that Dugin’s Eurasianism and Classical Eurasianism, being 
directly linked only by the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, do not 
form an unbroken chain of Eurasianist discourse. Yet this argument, in Dugin’s 
                                            
75 Andreas Umland and Bavaria Eichstaett, “Fascist Tendencies in Russia’s Political,” 16. 
76 Alexander Dugin, Putin vs Putin: Vladimir Putin viewed from the Right (London: Arktos 
Media, 2014), 49–50. 
77 Alexander Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, trans. Mark Sleboda and Michael Millerman 
(London: Arktos Media, 2012), 100. 
78 Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology, 100. 
 25
mind, creates enough evidence to successfully bond Classical to Neo-
Eurasianism. 
B. DUGIN’S DESIRE TO CREATE A “GLOBAL” EURASIANISM 
One of the primary differences between Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism and 
Classical Eurasianism lies in how Dugin portrays his version as a global 
movement. Dugin, unlike the Classical Eurasianists, attempts to internationalize 
his theory as a means to increase its popularity, develop legitimacy, and 
supposedly begin his expansionist policies. To do so, his work generally receives 
multiple translations and he actively develops ties with anti-globalization 
movements outside of Russia. His followers also maintain websites in as many 
as thirty-four different languages.79  These efforts show how Dugin sees 
Eurasianism as a global alternative to liberalism in addition to a cultural destiny of 
Russia, or, in his own words: “our goal is Indo-European Empire - from 
Vladivostok to Dublin.”80 Yet, his arguments for an international version largely 
fail to garner widespread support and as such make more sense as a means to 
aid in the legitimation of the Eurasianist movement in Russia. 
1. Where Eurasianism Can Work 
For some areas, Dugin’s expansive Eurasianist rhetoric makes a great 
deal of sense. Central Asia in particular maintains strong ties with Russia, has a 
history of authoritarian rule, and its geography allows for interpretations of a 
“Third Way.”  Promoting Eurasianism in Central Asia would naturally benefit 
Russia and due to the pervasive Soviet academic heritage in Central Asia this 
becomes a natural outgrowth of its academia. Turkey as well, has active 
Eurasianists that work toward interpreting its own way in between Westernization 
and traditional Islam.81 Turkey lacks the communist traditions of Russia, 
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suggesting that any Eurasianist movements in the country must form as a 
response to Westernism. Likewise, Eurasianism in Western Europe forms 
alongside and within right-wing, anti-EU, groups, but these movements form 
alliances of convenience with little doctrinal similarities outside of a response to 
current U.S. led world hegemony.82   
2. Eurasianism Remains Russocentric 
Dugin’s Eurasianism unravels by attempting to create a Russocentric anti-
Westernism that attempts to appeal to countries outside Russia. By expanding 
Eurasianism beyond Russia, Dugin removes some of the cultural arguments that 
Classical Eurasianism used to differentiate Russia from the West. Classical 
Eurasianism used Orthodoxy and even authoritarianism to show divergence from 
Europe, but to create a universal movement Dugin relies primarily on anti-
Westernism with some help from his own version of geopolitics. Meanwhile, he 
uses Russian Orthodoxy and culture as a means to expand Eurasianism in 
Russia itself. Within Russia, his Eurasianism maintains the cultural arguments 
needed to appease ethnic Russians, but this evidence shows that the primary 
purpose of moving Eurasianism beyond Russia’s borders lies with maintaining 
his own political legitimacy within Russia. 
3. International Rapprochement Undermines Eurasianism 
In addition to undermining the cultural argument, Dugin’s rapprochement 
with other states impairs his own anti-liberal views. Because Dugin relies on an 
expansionist view of the Russian state, he encourages the rapprochement of 
Russia with Japan, Germany, and even India; however, by encouraging such 
outreach, he undermines his own desire to limit Western influences.83  Germany, 
an EU and NATO member, remains dedicated to the West, Japan and Russia 
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still argue over the Kuril islands, and both Japan and India’s cultural differences 
divide it from Russia more than Russia’s own cultural differences separate it from 
Europe.   
Dugin also sees China as a potential enemy to Russia-not because of its 
rising economic and military might, but due the much less likely possibility of its 
joining an alliance with the United States.84  Certainly, a Sino-US pact would 
pose a credible threat to Dugin’s designs for Russia, but more importantly, it 
shows the particularity of the Russian “land bridge” in Dugin’s version of 
Eurasianism. He readily believes that Japan will one day form a pact with Russia 
and makes efforts to show China as a dominating force in East Asia. This is 
despite the fact that China, politically and economically, opposes the West orders 
of magnitude greater than Japan. Put simply, China is a rival to Russia; Dugin 
realizes this and makes efforts to propose a means to balance China that does 
not involve rapprochement with the US, despite the impossibility of actually 
creating a Russo-Japan security partnership.85  Such particularism on the part of 
Dugin, weakens the actual argument for Eurasianism and shows his need to 
create a Russo-centric argument to account for Russia’s rivalries. 
4. Eurasianism Only Benefits Russia through Its “Third Way” 
Dugin’s Eurasianism, rather than seeking a “Third Way” apart from Europe 
or Asia, seeks a “Third Way” through the inclusion of Europe and Asia. According 
to Marlene Laurelle, “Unlike the Eurasianists of the 1920s, Dugin does not talk of 
an irreducible and romantic opposition between East and West.86 In Dugin’s 
theories, both Asia and Europe are destined to come under Russian-Eurasian 
domination.”87  He believes Russia will eventually grow in size and scope to 
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cover larger portions of Europe and Asia. This argument fails to make a coherent 
Eurasianist discourse for two primary reasons. The first being that the Classical 
Eurasianists argued for a “Third Way” apart from Europe. By seeking its inclusion 
and even expanding the term, Eurasianism no longer encompasses a separate 
path for Europe but becomes an expansionist and even imperial argument. 
Secondly, to avoid liberalism and Westernism, Dugin must account for cultural 
differences alongside any expansionist rhetoric and largely fails to do so. This 
makes Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism less of an ideology with set precepts and more 
of a political theory willing to change and adapt to trends. 
C. DUGIN’S ATTITUDES TOWARD ETHNICITY AND RELIGION 
Adding to Dugin’s views on globalization, his beliefs on race and ethnicity 
lack the consistency needed for an overarching ideology. Unlike his immediate 
predecessor, Lev Gumilev, who based his Eurasianist arguments almost solely 
on race, Dugin aims to lessen the centrality of any ethnic discourse. This goal 
comes as a natural extension of his desire to create a Russo-centric empire but 
can also be seen as merely a means to expand his own influence. Importantly 
though, his own views on race remain difficult to pin down. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, before garnering fame as the author of Foundations of Geopolitics, 
he co-founded the anti-Semitic Pamyat movement.88  Yet, by the time he 
received public acclaim any anti-Semitism or racialism remained downplayed and 
he even accused at least one prominent Communist party leader of anti-
Semitism.89   According to Marlene Laurelle, “Today, he is attempting to play 
down these aspects of his thought in order to present himself as a ‘politically 
correct thinker waiting to be recognized by the regime.’”90  This argument 
remains the clearest and most acceptable reason for why he no longer espouses 
anti-Semitism. Russia’s own ethnic make-up requires some tolerant adherences 
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to public sentiment in order to maintain a relevant place in the political system 
and Dugin sacrifices his own anti-Semitism to garner such political legitimacy. 
However, the fact that Dugin downplays his anti-Semitism does not mean that it 
or other racial prejudices no longer exist as his own membership in Pamyat and 
writings on the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy suggest these that Dugin sacrifices 
them while in the public sphere.91 
Dugin also portends to advocates religious freedom.92  Here again, 
however, his views hardly match his discourse. He openly advocates Orthodoxy 
as the truest of Christian religions because of the perceived “Third Rome” notion 
of Orthodoxy descending directly from Byzantium. Yet, how does Dugin manage 
to effectively promote Orthodoxy as a superior Christian sect without maintaining 
a stance on religious freedom?  To do so he makes two separate arguments-
when referring to Christianity he maintains his Orthodox stance, but he changes 
his tone when dealing with religions and peoples who fall outside of Christendom. 
Dugin sees Christian traditions outside of Orthodoxy as an aberration descended 
from false Christian doctrine that avoids traditional Christian practices.93  
Orthodoxy, as the supposed direct link with the early church, maintains traditional 
values and allows Dugin to praise the Russian religion while avoiding 
rapprochement with the West. This stance also helps Dugin avoid comparisons 
with the Pan-Slavists. The Pan-Slavists sought to unite all Slavic peoples, but 
Westernization created a significant cultural divide in addition to the religious 
divides separating Russia and the Catholic Slavs of Central Europe. By 
maintaining the religious argument, Dugin does not aim to downplay the role of 
Catholics, but rather he seeks to elevate the roles of Orthodoxy and ethnic 
Russians-a necessary step for anyone seeking political power in Russia where a 
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growing Muslim minority poses a conceivable threat to Russian cultural 
homogeneity and identity.    
1. Dugin’s Traditionalism 
Dugin also uses religion as a means to garner rapprochement with the 
non-Western, non-Christian world. To understand his views on non-Christians, 
one must first approach the topic of Dugin’s Traditionalism. Traditionalism, 
founded by the French writer Rene Guenon in the early 1900s, aims to bring 
pagan traditions and practices into Christian worship as a means to espouse the 
“Sacred Knowledge” held before organized Christian religion.94  According to 
Anton Shekhovtsov and Andreas Umland, “Traditionalists repudiate all 
achievements of modernity and, instead, subscribe to a mythologized and 
idealized interpretation of humanity’s past.”95  Dugin advocates such a return to 
traditional practices in Russia and even sees Eurasianism itself as an outgrowth 
of traditionalism. For Dugin, the crux of Traditionalism lies in how it combines 
cultural practices with religious ones. Traditionalists espouse cultural practices, 
but for Dugin it forms a way to combine his own nationalist leanings with religious 
thought.96 Importantly, Traditionalism gives Dugin a means to advocate 
Buddhist, Muslim, and other non-Christian traditions while not supplanting his 
own Orthodox beliefs. Many scholars will assert; however, that Dugin is not a 
Traditionalist at all, but rather uses the movement to garner wider support for his 
own political and academic designs.97  The emphasis on culture and local 
practices simply allows him to use Traditionalism as a means to permeate 
societies outside of Orthodox Russia while avoiding difficult religious discourse 
that could endanger his own interpretation of Russian Orthodox supremacy. 
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2. Dugin’s Use of Religion to Garner Eurasianist Legitimacy 
Dugin remains committed to using religion as a way to remain politically 
and academically relevant. For example, he converted from the Russian 
Orthodox religion to the Old Believer subset of Orthodoxy.98  Ostensibly, he did 
so in order to remain closer to the purported old church beliefs that remain, in his 
view, truer to early Christian practices and his own Traditionalist beliefs; 
however, the actual reason makes more sense when taken from a political 
standpoint. According the Traditionalist scholar Mark Sedgwick writing on Dugin, 
“this detail [joining the old believers] makes no sense in Guénonian [founder of 
traditionalism] or Traditionalist terms, but makes a lot of sense in Russian terms, 
since it allows Dugin to have excellent relations with the mainstream Orthodox 
Church.”99  This act of Dugin further emphasizes the religious character of his 
Eurasianism as one of seeking political legitimacy rather than forming a piece of 
a functional Eurasianist ideology. 
Additionally, Dugin’s religious views show just how much his Eurasianism 
differs from the Classical Eurasianists. By relying largely on a near 
incomprehensible version of Traditionalism that emphasizes Orthodoxy and 
nationalist practices, Dugin’s Eurasianism differs too much from the basic 
Russian Orthodox component of Classical Eurasianism. According to Boris 
Ishboldin, “The term [Eurasian] is used by the Russian Eurasians to express the 
idea that geographically, historically, and culturally Russia is neither Europe nor 
Asia but a continent in itself.”100  Dugin however, uses Traditionalism and religion 
as a means to show that the Orthodoxy makes Russia similar to Islamic and 
Buddhist traditions. This means of argument still maintains anti-Western 
sentiments, but removes the key Orthodox exceptionalism of Classical 
Eurasianism when adjusting Neo-Eurasianism to a non-western and non-Russian 
audience. By forming separate religious arguments for the East and West, Dugin 
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fails to show a “Third Way” for Russia because the argument for the West 
(Russian Orthodox exceptionalism) and the East (stressing Traditionalist 
rapprochement) lack the coherence and simplicity to provide an efficacious 
religious ideology for his Neo-Eurasianism. 
D. DUGIN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 
Dugin tries to tie his own theories with that of mainstream Russian political 
parties, but his efforts receive mixed results. According to Marlene Laurelle, “his 
theoretical position is too complex for any party to follow him entirely and turn 
him into its official thinker,” and his experiences with the Communist party largely 
prove her assertion.101 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Dugin served as an 
advisor to the Communist Party member and Speaker of the Duma Gennady 
Seleznev. Additionally, Communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov uses 
elements of Eurasianism as part of his own political message.102 Dugin’s role as 
an advisor failed to bring him into the public spotlight or to a more prominent role 
within the party itself. This led to him rejecting formalized party-led Communism 
in favor of his Eurasianist “Third way.”103  Considering Dugin’s origins as an 
academic rather than a politician, it makes sense for him to be unable to find a 
permanent place in the Communist party establishment. The Communist party 
remains an institution with its own cultural and ideological path dependence that 
limits the acceptability of new ideas. Because of this, Eurasianism as an ideology 
could not survive in the Communist establishment and relegated Dugin as a 
minor actor rather than an official ideologue. Also, the crux of his Eurasianist 
theories and his most famous book, Foundations of Geopolitics, uses geography 
on a conceptual level to create, at least theoretically, the foundations of 
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Eurasianism. By using geopolitics to underline his Eurasianist discourse, he 
crafts a difficult message to include in any party’s functional ideology. Geopolitics 
lacks the emotional weight of race, religion, or even political alignments like 
Communism because it lies within academia and international relations theory 
and thus out of mind of the average Russian. Additionally, and for the Communist 
party in particular, the long history of the Soviet Union creates a wealth of 
ideological symbolism and identity that eliminates the need to for a fully 
functioning Eurasianist ideology. While Dugin aims to create a “third way” to 
justify Russian exceptionalism this argument remains difficult if not impossible for 
the Communist party to use on an everyday basis; hence, Dugin functioned as 
an advisor but never really rose to a higher function within the party.   
1. Dugin and the Russian Far Right 
Dugin’s Eurasianism also fails to form a means of ethnic identity for right 
wing political movements. To be a Communist party member or Fascist appeals 
more to Russia’s right wing because they contain a real or implied ethnocentric 
basis that elevates Russia at the same time as Great Russians. In reality, Dugin 
uses his watered down form of ethnocentrism as a means to differentiate himself 
from other national groups. He openly denounces racism, yet emphasizes the 
work of Lev Gumilev and especially Gumilev’s ethnos.104  Gumilev’s ethnos 
promotes the idea that each ethnic people develops an ecological niche to fulfill 
specific roles on the world stage.105  The fall of the Soviet Union drastically 
changed the ethnic discourse in the country, but Dugin cannot find the means to 
control the discourse. During Soviet times, Great Russians made up roughly half 
of the population whereas nowadays they make up 79.8%.106  The shifting of 
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ethnic lines creates a desire for a more racialized discourse of Russian 
Nationalism that Dugin tries to mobilize through emphasizing ethnos while 
maintaining his anti-racialist sentiments. Similar to his separate arguments for 
religion, he makes two Eurasianist arguments to both emphasize Russian 
ethnicity while arguing against racism, but the two arguments together fail to 
provide an uniquely “Eurasian” identity.   
2. Dugin and His Views of Fascism 
Alexander Dugin’s interest in Fascism undermines Eurasianism as 
working concept. Dugin places Fascism alongside Liberalism and Communism 
as the three forms of government in the modern world.107  In the 1990s, Dugin 
actively promoted Fascism and even referred to the Nazi Third Reich as the 
closest entity encompassing his own views of a Russian “Third Way.”108 Over 
time he lessened the prominence of fascism as a template for his Eurasianism, 
but he still promotes the works of some Fascist ideologues. Looking at 
Eurasianism and Fascism, both rely on a creating and fostering a strong 
authoritarian government with James Heiser noting, “His belief in placing the 
state before its people harkens back to fascism even if Dugin himself avoids such 
comparisons.”109  Likewise, both ideologies create a true and superior identity for 
its people though Eurasianism lacks the strong emphasis on racial tenants. As a 
result, Dugin’s fascist influence contributes to his own Eurasianist ideals and 
limits its functionality as a standalone concept.   
In the public sphere, Dugin takes measures to limit any latent pro-Fascist 
views. By emphasizing a negative view of Fascism in response to his earlier 
ideas and membership in Fascist organizations he garners support amongst the 
Russian population for himself and thus tertiary support for his other ideas. In 
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Russia, Fascism remains strongly linked to Nazism and Dugin is aware of the 
damage overtly promoting Fascism could cause to Eurasianism.110  According to 
Andreas Umland and Bavaria Eichstaett, “To be sure, Dugin has, for obvious 
reasons, been eager to disassociate himself from German Nazism, at times 
strongly condemning Hitler’s crimes, and now often introduces himself as an 
“anti-Fascist.”111  Dugin does however, continue to promote his Fascist ideas in 
a less visible way through his publishing company that regularly underwrites 
Fascist works.112 
E. CONCLUSION 
Overall, Dugin fails to make a convincing argument that his own 
Eurasianist theories form an ideological whole. According to Anton Shekhovtsov 
and Andreas Umland “We and others, including Ilya Vinkovetsky and Stefan 
Wiederkehr, have argued that Dugin primarily used the terminology, rather than 
ideology, of the Russian émigré movement of the 1920s and 1930s, while 
formulating his new version of “Eurasianism.”“113  Dugin’s theories concentrate 
on his need to remain politically relevant. Only through the desire to develop and 
maintain a place in the public’s eye do his attempts to reinvent himself make 
sense. His moves away from Fascism and Communism show his desire to 
function at the head of a movement rather than play a supporting role. His ever-
changing Traditionalist theories show a desire to expand his influence to Central 
Asia and other predominantly Muslim areas. Lastly, his efforts to create an 
international Eurasianism gain himself followers in Europe. All these efforts aim 
to increase his own prestige and power but cannot function together on an 
ideological level to provide a large scale source of identity to the Russian people.  
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Further exacerbating his own need for political gain, Dugin’s public face 
differs from his academic one. According to Umland, Andreas, and Bavaria 
Eichstaett, “via television shows like Leontev’s Odnako, an encrypted and 
somewhat softer form of Duginism, however, reaches much of Russia’s 
population on an almost daily basis.”114  He therefore makes adaptations to 
maintain a public face and in doing so the actual message of his Eurasianism 
becomes an aberration that adjusts to an ever-changing political climate. Thus, 
Dugin’s Eurasianism falls more in line with nationalism, and in particular, a form 
of nationalism that suits the Russian traditions of authoritarianism and anti-
Westernism.115  While neither of these traditions are new or creative, Dugin’s 
efforts put a new face on them that leads to gains in public perception. 
Despite his Eurasianism most closely resembling nationalism, Dugin 
claims he is not a Russian nationalist. However, his theories suggest nationalism 
as the most consistent portion of his ideology. When taken together, his varying 
ideals: Traditionalism, Eurasianism, and a reliance on metaphysics create 
multiple ideologies that try to garner support from varying right wing groups in 
Russia but rarely all at once or as a whole. Thus, Dugin becomes an ideologue 
without a set ideology-though he terms it Eurasianism. He attempts to cater to 
any group with an anti-Western agenda or nostalgic for the Soviet Union; and 
moreover, he tries to surmise the generalized and persistent anti-Westernism 
himself. This effort directly aligns with nationalism to the point that the foremost 
Western scholar on Dugin, Marlene Laurelle, even deems him a nationalist vice 
an Eurasianist.116  This strategy works in placing Dugin in positions of 
prominence as a political advisor and geopolitical expert, but fails to create a true 
Eurasianist ideology. 
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IV. EURASIANISM AS IDEOLOGY 
The most important issue for Russia is to seek out a national idea, 
a national ideology.117 
—Boris Yeltsin, 
First President of the Russian Federation, 1996 
My opinion is that they’re messaging us that they are a Great 
Power and that they have the ability to exert these kinds of 
influences in our thinking.118 
—General Philip Breedlove, 
EUCOM Commander, Supreme Allied Commander NATO, 2014. 
 
In modern Russia, even if one considers it a Rentier state, governing elites 
need to show some accountability and legitimacy by the people to remain in 
power. State run or highly influenced media must foster an ideology that ensures 
the people perceive the state as a legitimate source of governance. Russia is no 
different. The loss of Soviet ideology created an immense cultural and functional 
vacuum in the Russian Federation. Margot Light in her essay, “In Search of an 
Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology,” says that, “Soviet 
Ideology included a description of the past, a diagnosis of the present and a 
blueprint of an ideal future, together with an indication of the means by which the 
future would be attained.”119  This weight of ideology and its subsequent loss 
wears heavily on Russians today and aims to replace it create a transitional 
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identity crisis for the people. Russia must fill this vacuum in order to account not 
only for its loss but for the greatness the Soviet Union brought to individual mind 
of the Russian people.   
Eurasianism seeks to fill the ideological void with its own rhetoric but 
largely falls short due the existence of more viable alternatives, such as 
Communism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Dugin’s theories fail to gain 
widespread support in Russia despite his growing popularity and desire to create 
a “Third Way” for Russia. The ideological landscape demands less of “Third 
Way” and more a return to the perception of Russia as a Great Power similar to 
the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent the imperial state.120 Herein lies the true 
desire of the Russian state-to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
through maintaining Great Power status.121  Anything less would signal that 
Russia lacks the strength of the Soviet Union. Eurasianism seeks to aid the state 
in this effort. The primary appeal of Eurasianism as a plausible Russian ideology 
stems from the desire of Russians to view their state as a Great Power; however, 
Eurasianism competes for this role amongst other ideologies and as such the 
majority of Russians do not identify solely with Eurasianism to maintain Great 
Power status. 
A. THE ROLE AND LOSS OF IDEOLOGY IN RUSSIA 
To expand on the role of Eurasianism in present day Russia, one must 
first look at the role of ideology in the state. Ideology serves to legitimate both the 
state itself and the people’s position in it; According to Iain MacKenzie: 
All ideologies, of whatever hue, embody an account of social and 
political reality and an account of how that reality could be bettered. 
On the one hand, then, ideologies help us to make sense of the 
complex social world in which we live. They do this by providing a 
description of society, an intellectual map, which enables us to 
position ourselves in the social landscape… On the other hand, 
while providing a description of social reality, ideologies also 
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embody a set of political ideals aimed at detailing the best possible 
form of social organization.122 
Eurasianism creates just such an ideology by attempting to limit Western 
influences in Russia. Through an emphasis on uniquely Russian social and state 
traits, such as authoritarian legacies, expansive geography, and differing cultural 
and religious values, Eurasianism defines the Russian identity through one’s own 
adherence to said traits. Eurasianists largely promote such action in order to 
create positions of political power for themselves by promoting the legitimacy of 
the authoritarian Russian state, and they do so with the very intent of defining 
Russianness as one and the same as Eurasianist. 
The opportunity to create a viable ideology in the Russian Federation 
stems from the loss of Soviet ideology. The elevation of the worker, projection of 
Russia as a “Great Power,” and the pride of projecting a Socialist state all filled 
the ideological role of providing the means for each individual to see in 
themselves the Soviet state. To account for the losses in territory, Russian 
supremacy, and the arguable loss of “Great Power” status new ideologies come 
into play and Eurasianism actively aims to fill this void. It provides an ideology in 
order to strengthen Russians in the same vein of Soviet ideology by promoting 
history, culture, and most importantly a “Third Way” as a sorely needed source of 
pride. 
Though the need to create a state ideology exists—what that ideology 
should become remains unanswered. Following the Soviet, according to James 
Billington, “Russians had to rethink their politics, economic, history, and place in 
the world.”123  The Soviet ideals fell and many Western observers fully expected 
that the new Russia would fall immediately into the Euro-American sphere of 
influence. As early as 1987, the year Gorbachev referred to as “the Year of 
Europe,” the Soviet Union sought to create increasingly more European style 
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institutions and reforms.124  Yet these ideals proved largely incapable of 
overcoming the patrimonial traditions of Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. In 
the meantime, Russians fell victim to a lack of state ideology – the old regime 
remained too far out of mind, the Soviet Union fell, and Russians themselves 
could not rightly consider themselves European. Eurasianism provides a uniquely 
Russian national ideal that maintains the perceived strength of the Soviets and 
theoretically stems from a primordial concept of Classical Eurasianism. In 
providing such an ideology, the Eurasianists help rectify the divide between the 
people and the Russian state. These efforts develop the collective 
consciousness of Russians into an accompanying ideology that determines the 
norms for state action both domestically and at home.125 
B. EURASIANIST IDENTITY IN RELATION TO THE WEST 
For an ideology to function, it must provide a means of identity to the 
people. In turn, the Russian people must identify with the state in order to 
legitimate the state itself. This process of nation building requires the people to 
gain a self-consciousness of their similarities and identities as a whole, and 
Eurasianism aims to determine this identity.126  The process links peoples 
through common cultural traits, attributes, and habits through which nationalities 
form and Eurasianism carefully selects those habits and ideals that both exist in 
the collective Russian mind and further their own ends. Furthermore, the people 
must see themselves as a unique whole with fundamental differences between 
that of the peoples of other nations. Walker Connor says, “A nation is a group of 
people characterized by a myth of common descent. Moreover, regardless of its 
roots, a nation must remain an essentially endogamous group in order to 
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maintain its myth.”127  This view of a common descent comes about from the 
shared history and may take many forms. Language, books, and habits all play a 
role in making one see a shared cultural history. Other aspects also reinforce 
these primordial ties. Religion, for instance, can and will tie together numerous 
peoples and is particularly true in Russia which has seen a marked rise in the 
level of religious adherence amongst its people.128  Many of the shared traits 
may have only a tenuous grasp over the people or even be entirely made up by 
the rulers of a nation; however, it is the traits and not their function which unite 
people through a shared identity.   
1. Eurasianism as Primordial Identity 
Eurasianism aims to create a primordial myth of the common Russian 
experience as a means to craft an identity outside of Russia’s relationship with 
Europe. The Russian identity remains obscure in the post-Soviet society and 
Eurasianists actively promote their own version. For example, debates on the 
“Russian Idea” regularly take place on Russian television with Alexander Dugin 
playing a prominent role to further his own version of the idea.129  These, 
rehearsed, Kremlin backed, discussions aim to instill a definition of Russianness 
to the people in order to shape a populous accepting of the Russian state. This 
goal differs from Classical Eurasianism that aimed to only show the differences 
between Russia and Europe and rectify the Russian condition to Europeans. 
Neo-Eurasianism argues for what aspects of Russian society create the “Russian 
ideal” in order to legitimate the state. Eurasianists face difficulties in creating an 
overarching ideology though.130  By relying heavily on geopolitics, as the 
academic manifest of Eurasianism does, it creates only a marginal means of 
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Russian identity that forces Eurasianists to rely on other ideals, such as 
Communism and Orthodoxy, to complement the academic side in public debates. 
These ideals place Eurasianism amongst other right-wing groups in competition 
for an ever more obscure place in society. Additionally, anti-Westernism provides 
Eurasianists a means to promote Russian identity by emphasizing negative 
aspects of European and American culture relative to Russian culture. Such 
emphasis further cements Eurasianism’s purpose of enhancing the perceived 
value of Russian cultural and societal ideals.    
2. Europe, the West, and the Russian Identity 
Mainland Europe exacerbated the identity issue amongst post-Soviet 
Russians that led to increasingly more demand for a new ideology. The West 
largely supported nationalist and independent movements in former Soviet 
States while downplaying or even ridiculing those in Russia.131  This pushback 
against Russia while embracing other Slavic nations such as Poland, the Baltic 
Countries, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine led Russians to question 
the West’s view of the Russian Federation. Russia traditionally strove to maintain 
a European identity since long before the Soviet Union, and once the Soviet 
Union ended Russians expected a move toward the West, particularly in the 
economic sphere.132  Europe, however, never fully included the new Russia or 
saw it as European state. This attitude mirrors the historical view where Tsars 
strove to turn around the mainland European view of Russia as a backward, 
impoverished frontier, but found only a lukewarm response from Europeans. 
These perceptions carry over into the post-Soviet era partly as a result of 
traditionally held beliefs but also due to the decades of Cold War gamesmanship 
that dramatically lowered European esteem for Russian culture.133 The newly 
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independent Warsaw Pact countries also made pronounced efforts to set 
themselves apart from the former Soviet occupiers. These countries naturally did 
so in an effort to emphasize their own European identity and to further 
economically entwine themselves in Europe. After decades of rule under the 
Soviets, they sought to relieve themselves of Russian influences that drove them 
further into the Western influence while continuing to rebuff Russian state. These 
sentiments toward Russia increased the perceived divide between Russia and 
Europe that punctuates the need amongst Russians to return to a semblance of 
their Soviet Great Power glory. 
C. EURASIANISM AND RUSSIA AS A GREAT POWER 
Eurasianism’s reliance on geopolitics and emphasizing the massive size 
of Russia as a means of identity paints the Russian state as a Great Power.  
Numerous definitions of Great Power exist that cover both economic and military 
aspects of a state, but most importantly when analyzing modern day Russia 
remains the question of whether or not Russia is still a Great Power with the 
ability to enforce in international desires and policies on the level of the US, 
China, and even France or Japan. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union held Great 
Power status due to its size and military might, but the question of whether or not 
the Russian Federation is a Great Power remains unanswered. With a weak 
economy, declining birth rate, and the migration of both its money and most 
esteemed scientists, the Russian argument rests primarily on the strength of its 
military and nuclear arsenal.134  As Dmitri Trenin states, “It [Russia] has territory, 
resources and a sizable nuclear arsenal, for all that is worth today, but it lacks 
real economic strength.”135  For Russians and the rest of the world, the military 
alone is not enough to readily deem Russia a great or even a global power and 
comes far from emulating the power of the Soviet Union once showed. As a 
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result, the Russian Federation finds itself in need of an ideology not only to 
define the “Russian Experience,” but to overcome the perceived loss of strength 
and prestige.   
To avoid the loss of prestige, Eurasianism portrays Russia as a Great 
Power on the basis of its immense size and uses geopolitics to justify using 
sheer land area to elevate a people and a state. Dugin himself refers to the 
concept of a “Sacred Geography” in order to place his own geopolitics on a 
pedestal above traditional sciences.136  By emphasizing a “sacred” geography, 
he minimalizes possible criticism or objectivity when questioning Eurasianist 
viewpoints; however, such terminology weakens Eurasianism itself. According to 
James Billington, “Eurasianism may well be the last gasp of a depleted 
intelligentsia seeking to cobble together an ideology that could revive Russian 
power and give themselves a central role in its exercise.”137  Seeking a “Third 
Way” through geopolitics defines the metrics for which the Russian state defines 
itself and as such creates an illusion of functional power on the world stage. 
1. The Russian State and Great Power 
The Russian state strives to maintain Great Power status in the midst of 
the many aspects of the Russian Federation that suggest it no longer plays such 
a role. Antonovič Marijuš states, “Russia’s authorities claimed that Russia was a 
Great Power, which is exactly the same as what all Eurasianist theorists 
argue.”138  The state sees the need to remain strong and relevant both 
domestically and abroad in order to survive. Traditionally, Russia used its power 
over its own people as a means of strength and this legacy both made the state a 
global power and increased the perception of the state as a powerful entity in the 
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people’s minds.139  Russian history contains instances of conscription, 
relocation, collectivization, and industrialization that all show the immense power 
the state held on the people. Over time, these instances became the norm and 
created a perverse situation where the people can only truly respect a state with 
immense control-and to have such control the state must maintain respect 
abroad as well as at home. As such, the state must maintain such power to 
remain legitimate in the eyes of the people. 
Russia must play a central role in European affairs, as any other role 
paints Russia as less than a historical and current Great Power. Russia 
performed largely as a Great Power for the past 200 years with the exception of 
the years between the Tsar and the Bolsheviks. Through these efforts, the state 
became accustomed to its status and today this role extends to Russian identity 
itself. The need to maintain a Great Power position thus prevents large scale 
efforts to fully embrace European style democratization as to do so would 
weaken Russia’s traditional sources of power in the people and the state’s ability 
to control politics. Historically, educated elites could seek Europeanization 
because they remained aware of the aspects of European superiority in 
technology, education, and liberalism. The common Russian, however, remained 
aloof to the world order and his place in it; he knew primarily the power of the 
state and that alone justified its actions in the peasant’s eyes. The modern world 
took the lid off the average Russian’s eyes and forced the Russian and Soviet 
governments to account for the state’s place in relation to other states. 
Eurasianism, Russian Messianism, and Slavophilism all originate from this 
phenomena. The historical place of the peasant in society echoes today. 
Perhaps the Russian state’s foremost dissenter, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, states 
the following in regard to the past and current Russian experiences, “[Russia has 
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been] flung back far into the distant past: politically, economically, 
psychologically.”140 
2. Anti-Westernism and Great Power 
Anti-Westernism helps the Russian state maintain control over its people 
while helping to define Russian identity. The state uses anti-Western sentiments 
to provide continuity with a Russian primordial past.141  It uses a perceived lack 
of morality in Europe and the United States Russia to elevate Russian historical 
traditions to increase the legitimacy of its own version of Russian identity.142  
Centering on the strength of the state with influences from Russian Orthodoxy 
and the elevation of a honorable peasant culture, the state willingly creates an 
identity that encourages and promotes anti-Westernism. According to Sean 
Cannady and Paul Kubicek, “Representative, liberal democracy—a foreign idea 
imported from the West—had been tried in the 1990s, but by the end of the 
decade many Russians associated the idea of democracy with political, 
economic, and social failure.”143 These ideas from the West and the general 
economic and cultural malaise of Russia during the 1990s, created all the state 
needed to justify anti-Westernism as part of the larger Russian identity. The 
1990s saw economic suffering on the part of Russians while the former Soviet 
satellites grew closer and closer to Western Europe that led to the transition from 
Soviet’s seeing Western military threat to Russia seeing a Western threat to 
ideology and identity but incapable of seeing the academic justification behind 
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the ire for the West. Eurasianism provides such a justification for both the state 
and the people despite being a collection of generalized concepts. 
Anti-Westernism in modern Russia stems from a perceived lack of Great 
Power status. The loss of Great Power status directly threatens the essence of 
Russian identity. Russia grew used to demanding respect from its European 
brethren due to its overwhelming size, sizable population, and military strength. 
As this strength grew into a source of identity, the threat to Russia’s Great Power 
did not change. As in the Cold war, the threat remained Europe and the United 
States with the addition of many Eastern European countries that have come 
under the influence of the EU and NATO.   To Russians, this appears as an 
incarnation—not of a new globalized capitalism, but of Europeans aiming to 
systemically weaken the Russian Federation through the exploitation of its 
traditional realm of influence. Today, these sentiments take on a more 
aggressive form as the state aims to secure its own power at the cost of its 
relations with the West. According to Andrew Wood, “The mental inheritance of 
the Soviet Union is clear: Any benefit to one country or group of countries is paid 
for by another, usually Russia.”144  The liberalism of the West thus becomes a 
threat to Russians as a result of their Soviet legacy.   
D. CONCLUSION 
Marcel H. Van Herpen states, “Three times—in 1856, 1905, and 1917—
modern Russia had tried to reform itself after a lost war. Three times it failed.”145  
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia attempted modest 
reforms but failed as well. Eurasianism aims to replace a bevy of Soviet ideals 
that legitimize the state and provide an identity for the people. It competes for this 
role with other ideals, such as Communism, as Russian academics call for the 
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creation and strengthening of a Russian ideology.146  At its center, Eurasianism 
masses together the dissimilar ideals of messianism, geography, and anti-
Westernism to legitimate an authoritarian and patrimonial Russian state. 
For all of its effort, Eurasianism remains a distant thought in the minds of 
most Russians and the state itself. Dugin provides much rhetoric, but he remains 
largely in the academic sphere and provides little immediately graspable as 
either an identity or ideology. The power of the Russian state, however, remains 
central to the Russian ideal and the West must take care when addressing 
Russia because of this need.147  Arguably, today’s ideological need for Russian 
Great Power status stems from the states very lack of it following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. With a failed economy and the loss of its numerous 
satellites, post-Communist Russia fails to protect the pride and identity of 
Russians. Putin somewhat restored this status through bold maneuvers in foreign 
and economic policy, but it remains very much at risk today.  
Eurasianism plays off these sentiments in its unrelenting espousal of 
Russian cultural traits and insistence on fighting globalization. By keeping both its 
central tenets vague and showing support for the state, Eurasianism provides a 
dialogue that its primary opponents, Communism and ethnic nationalism, do not. 
Communism relies on Marxism and socialism to gain influence, while ethnic 
nationalism aims to elevate Great Russians-an ideal that remains more divisive 
than nationalist. Rather, Eurasianism combines anti-Western with authoritarian 
proclivities to provide a means of declaring Russia not only a Great Power but an 
expanding one as well. 
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V. EURASIANISM AND VLADIMIR PUTIN 
Increasingly, it is suggested that Vladimir Putin himself is a closet 
Eurasian.148 
—Mark Bassin 
Eurasianism “Classical” and “Neo,” 2008 
 
Alexander Dugin and the Neo-Eurasianist ideal seek to find an audience 
with Vladimir Putin but whether or not the Kremlin uses Eurasianism to formulate 
its grand strategy remains undetermined. Additionally, the somewhat ambiguous 
personal and professional relationship in between Dugin and Putin warrants 
further discussion to determine its extent and influence. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Eurasianism fails to provide a robust ideology, but it remains a 
potent idea that the Russian elites can use to justify, legitimize, and maintain 
their own place in the state.   
Putin’s own public stances suggest a mixed relationship with Russia as a 
Eurasian vice a European state. For instance, in 2000 Putin wrote, “Russia has 
always visualized itself as a Eurasian Power.”149  So shortly after taking office he 
affirmed a Eurasian vision of Russia, yet seeing Russia as a “Eurasian Power” 
does not mean abandoning a European identity; after all, the British Empire 
colonized much of Asia while remaining very much European. Conversely, Putin 
himself affirmed the European vision of Russia in 2007 by saying, “Today, when 
we are building a sovereign democratic state, we fully share the basic values and 
principles that make up the outlook of most Europeans.”150  These statements 
alone suggest Putin does not fully believe in Eurasianism itself as an ideology, 
but that does not limit aspects of the idea from playing a role in the Kremlin.   
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Relying solely on statements from Putin makes it difficult to determine how 
far, if at all, he embraces Eurasianism. A simple statement of expressing a desire 
to for rapprochement from an Asia country may serve multiple purposes, none of 
which directly emanate from the statement itself. As a politician, it makes perfect 
sense for Putin to take a middle of the road stance when crafting an idea of 
Russia’s cultural identity. Even an authoritarian must strive to limit any adverse 
political exposure. Expressing the wrong idea or even the right idea at the wrong 
time may diminish the support of the people; he must control the dialogue, not 
take part in it. Eurasianism remains a primarily right wing grouping of ideas and 
full embrasure by Putin, if it were to occur, must happen in the time and way of 
his choosing. Yet, this applies only to his public face and some of the ideas that 
Eurasianism espouses coincide with Putin’s own: rapprochement with Asia, 
limiting European influences, and providing a “Third Way” all in some fashion 
support Putin’s regime. This led some scholars to state that Putin embraces a 
“soft” version of Eurasianism.151  The Russian government does not directly 
support an Eurasianist future for the Russian Federation, but the relationship 
between Vladimir Putin and Alexander Dugin shows numerous ideological 
similarities. 
A. PUTIN AS AN AUTHORITARIAN 
Putin serves as an authoritarian ruler; a fact very much supported by the 
new Eurasianist discourse. Modern Eurasianists reject liberalism and democracy 
in favor of authoritarianism and this leads to general support of the Putin regime. 
Putin even employed Dugin for a time as an advisor to his government.152  Yet 
this facet of his regime does not mean Putin embraces Eurasianism to maintain 
his position as the head oligarch. Russia’s history contains numerous precedents 
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for authoritarianism to justify its place. From the Mongol rulers and their 
Muscovite princes to the Soviet Politburo, authoritarian models form the norm 
rather than the exception to Russia’s rule. This facet of the Russian state helped 
make the transition to democracy insurmountable. Eurasianism supports such 
authoritarian rule, not as a norm, but as a means of differentiation. To 
Eurasianists, authoritarian rule helps define Russia against the backdrop of a 
liberal Europe. The modern Eurasianists look at this as another example of how 
Russia sought an alternative to the liberal West and consequently see Putin’s 
government as carrying on such traditions.   
Putin does use Eurasianism as a means to contribute to the perception of 
his regime. According to Marlene Laurelle, “A soft version of Neo-Eurasianism, in 
which only the notion of Russia’s role as a geopolitical driver in Eurasia is 
retained, was adopted by the presidential party United Russia and the 
presidential administration, in order to ground the legitimacy of the Putin regime 
in the Soviet-era nostalgia shared by a large part of the population.”153  Putin 
thus uses Eurasianist leanings to help legitimize his own rule but he does not 
fully embrace an Eurasianist ideology for Russia. The need for such a discourse 
emanates from Putin’s own desire to limit, but not exclude, EU and US 
exposure.154  A solely Eurasianist policy would eliminate U.S. exposure while 
limiting the influence of the EU, both of which remain too economically painful for 
Putin to fully pursue. In the near term though, Eurasianism and authoritarianism 
go hand and hand and Putin naturally approves of an ideology that justifies and 
strengthens his own position. 
B. THE RELATIONSHIP IN BETWEEN VLADIMIR PUTIN AND 
ALEXANDER DUGIN 
Though Putin does embrace some aspects of Eurasianism, the 
relationship between Dugin and Putin is far from functional. Various scholars and 
journalists compare the relationship of Putin and Dugin to that of Rasputin and 
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Alexander or even suggest that Dugin is “Putin’s Brain,” but the actual 
relationship between the leader and ideologue does not form such strong ties.155 
At times, Dugin works as an advisor to Putin and has been generally supportive 
of Putin’s regime.156  Yet Dugin, as early as 2005, also became disappointed 
and critical of Putin as president.157  He generally provides support of Putin and 
his efforts to mold the Russian state but still finds aspects to criticize such as the 
lack of a state ideology.158  This willingness and ability to criticize Putin, while 
remaining generally supportive, shows how Dugin remains outside Putin’s inner 
circle. Furthermore, in 2014, Moscow State University removed Dugin as the 
chair of its sociology department which suggests that Dugin himself lacks the 
protections one would expect from of a crucial member of Putin’s state 
apparatus.159 
Further demonstrating a divide between the two men, Dugin, in his 2012 
book, Putin vs. Putin, criticizes the president primarily in areas of Dugin’s own 
purported expertise. For instance, Dugin states, “Nationalism, Stalinism and 
authoritarianism are the three main reference points for Russian modernization at 
its current historical stage, and if we don’t employ all three, modernization will 
remain an empty phrase.”160  Herein, Dugin couples the concept of 
modernization and economic growth to nationalism-an area which he remains a 
relevant expert. By manufacturing these needs, Dugin seeks to create his own 
place in the modern Russian landscape by filling what he see as an ideological 
hole in the Putin government. He reflects on this idea further by stating the 
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primary problem in Russia is: “The inadequacy of the ruling elite, the absence of 
a guiding ideology, the uncertainty and controversial nature of Russia’s political 
strategy.”161  While Dugin can admittedly do little to address his concern with 
Russia’s elites, he certainly can, and does, craft his Eurasianist ideology to fulfill 
a revanchist Russia while his geopolitics provide an answer to Russian grand 
strategy.   Overall, Dugin’s work on Putin reads more akin to an advertisement to 
Putin than to a full analysis into the leader. On the one hand he praises many of 
Putin’s actions, but on the other, Dugin insists on further actions that just happen 
to coincide with his own Eurasianism and geopolitics.   
The relationship between Putin and Dugin remains obscure in that any 
direct dialogue on it comes from Dugin himself. As evidenced by his demotion at 
Moscow State, Dugin’s relationship with Putin is tertiary at best. While Dugin 
remains influential in Russia, particularly amongst the military and certain political 
groups, one must take care when addressing the actual relationship between 
Dugin and Putin. This facet of the relationship is not lost on Dugin who states, 
“Putin’s style tends to be more general: he gives us an idea and leaves a lot of 
room for interpretation.”162  What the statement does not underline is how Dugin 
tends to do much of the interpreting. Overall, an ideological crafting between the 
two men does not exist and will likely remain non-existent into the future. Putin’s 
actions show that a renewed nationalism with a slight lean toward ideas that 
coincide with Eurasianism provide enough legitimacy for him to retain power into 
the near future. Dugin’s efforts at interpreting the Russian government’s anti-
Westernism as Eurasianism fail to provide a convincing argument that either 
Putin is an Eurasianist or that Dugin is the Kremlin’s ideological architect. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In a 2012 article Putin stated, “What we need is an ethnicity strategy 
based on patriotism. Any individual living in this country should be keenly aware 
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of their faith and ethnicity. But above all they must be citizens of Russia-and be 
proud of it.”163  His statement says many things and takes an ambiguous view on 
ethnicity, but at the same time it very much emphasizes Russian nationalism. 
Putin’s efforts coincide with many of the precepts of Eurasianism including 
authoritarianism, seeking a third way, and anti-Westernism, but nationalism best 
describes Putin’s near term strategy. As a politician he cannot afford to let 
Dugin’s overly ambitious Eurasian dialogue become state ideology, yet 
encouraging Russian nationalism allows Putin to maintain his place and weather 
near term economic issues. Yet Dugin does not openly support nationalism; 
rather, he sees it as a form of watered down fascism.164  To an Eurasianist, 
nationalism represents an ideal based more on the emotions of the people and 
their perceived place in the state rather than the pseudo-academic righteousness 
that Eurasianism espouses. In reality however, Eurasianism is a nationalist form 
of thought separated only by purported academic legitimacy.165 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The forces of Eurasianism will not surpass those of Russian nationalists 
and other right-wing organizations. The resurgence of Russian nationalism in the 
1980s helped bring about the fall of the Soviet Union in favor of the Russian 
Federation and the loose, ever-changing ideals of Eurasianists lack such 
prescience in the minds of the people.166  For all Dugin’s efforts at emphasizing 
a stateless ideal and recruiting foreign Eurasianists, it remains very much a pro-
Russian movement with a single people above all others. The foreign 
Eurasianists who align with Dugin, rather than fully accepting his ideals, put their 
own nationalist and ethnic spins on the concept.167  Moreover, Dugin’s form of 
Eurasianist nationalism is too obscure and disjointed to appeal to the whole of 
Russia. 
The Classical Eurasianists aimed to sell a Russian ideal to Europe; they 
loved their country and found it difficult to justify not only the perceived 
“backwardness” but the Bolshevik Revolution itself to their European colleagues. 
Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism takes a radically different course both in its audience 
and its purpose. It preaches a nationalist message to the Russian people while 
justifying the state’s role in their country. It upends the once popular notion that 
following the end of the Soviet Union, Russia would now take a place alongside 
the rest of Europe in the global democratic order.168 
The West must consider Great Power status in the context of Eurasianism 
to make any headway into diplomacy with Russia. Eurasianism offers a means to 
Great Power status through arguing for development outside the liberal model 
demonstrated by the EU. The European Union through seeking integration 
remains the primary model due to its proximity and cultural associations with 
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Russia itself. Russian. Classical Eurasianists sought to justify Russia’s path in 
relation to Europe, but Dugin and the Neo-Eurasianists, being more closely 
aligned with the Russian state, seek to glorify Russia. According to David Kerr, 
“As long as Russia desires to be a Great Power it must remain a Eurasian 
power,” and Eurasianism serves as way to argue that Russia, rather than 
atrophy, will continue to grow in strength.169  The EU and the U.S. consider this 
facet of the Russian state in its policy decisions. 
The anti-Western facet of Eurasianism’s nationalist message proves the 
most dangerous to the West. This facet limits Russia’s willingness to positively 
interact with supranational organizations and economic entities. Also, the anti-
Western message allows the Russian state to craft its own policies that serve 
itself rather than the Russian people by highlighting the perceived evils of 
Western civilization. This aspect of Russian nationalism directly affects European 
states as Russia’s willingness to solicit and support European rightist parties and 
organizations could exacerbate social upheaval in the rest of Europe.170 
Democracy came to Russia more as an afterthought than a revolution 
brought about by the people.171  As such, the value that democracies hold 
dearest-individual rights and freedom of speech never supplanted the path 
dependent authoritarianism of the Russian past. Following the economic malaise 
that accompanied the birth of the new Russian state, liberalism’s values could 
not overcome the idea of strong state that supports the jobs and stipends the 
people rely upon. Eurasianists simply provide a single means amongst many to 
prevent the institutional reforms needed to transform Russia into a truly 
democratic state and while Eurasianism may not serve as the state ideology it 
does demonstrate many of the current goals of the Russian Federation. 
                                            
169 David Kerr, “The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia’s Foreign Policy” 
Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 6 (1995): 986, http://www.jstor.org/stable/152839. . 
170 George Jahn and Elaine Ganley, “Russia Reaches Out to Europe’s Far Right Parties,” 
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